Although the published literature on auditor independence is extensive, an accepted comprehensive theory, framework or model of auditor independence risk does not exist. This paper develops a formal model of auditor independence risk that may be used to begin a more rigorous investigation of auditor independence and various factors that are thought to affect this risk.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, the Independence Standards Board (ISB) released an exposure draft titled "Statement of Independence Concepts -A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence" (ISB 2000) . 1 The exposure draft identifies four components of an independence framework: threats to auditor independence, safeguards to auditor independence, independence risk, and significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards. In February 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) released a more detailed document, Final Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements (SEC 2001) . The final rules draw on the conceptual framework developed by the ISB and address specific situations in which an auditor is not independent of an audit client. Those situations include certain financial, employment, and business relationships and also transactions or situations involving the provision of non-audit services or involving the receipt of contingent fees.
In November 2001, a framework similar to that of the ISB exposure draft was included in the IFAC (IFAC 2001) . In the academic arena, Johnstone et al. (2001) developed a framework identifying factors that may increase auditor independence risk and factors that may mitigate that risk. Each of these frameworks and set of rules is general in nature and only suggests loose connections between various factors. None of the frameworks or set of rules attempt to formally relate these connections.
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants
Independence risk (IR) is the risk that threats to auditor independence, to the extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor's ability to make unbiased audit decisions (ISB 2000) . In this paper, we develop a formal model of independence risk and use it to show how questions such as those involving complex interrelationships among model variables can be addressed. We recognize the various factors identified in the preliminary ISB framework, in the similar framework developed by the Ethics Committee of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 2001) , and in the Johnstone et al. (2001) framework. While each framework notes that independence may be impaired without auditor intent, we focus on intentional impairment resulting from knowledgeable actions taken by the auditor.
Specifically, we demonstrate the usefulness of the model by examining three different research questions:
1. What is the impact of a lack of auditor integrity on auditor independence risk? That is, independence will be impaired only when the auditor lacks integrity and when there is both opportunity and incentive.
For an auditor to knowingly allow his or her decisions to become biased, some form of incentive must exist. Otherwise, the auditor would be risking sanctions ranging from censure to expulsion from the profession with no compensating benefit. The various codes of ethics (e.g. IFAC 2001) and regulatory rules (e.g. SEC 2001) identify numerous incentives such as financial and employment relationships and non-audit services that may impact independence. Johnstone et al. (2001) categorize these as direct incentives and indirect incentives. Examples of direct incentives include financial investment in the client, consulting fees, contingent fees, promises of future employment, and material financial dependence.
Indirect incentives include situations such as when the auditor has strong interpersonal relationships with client personnel, or when family members have a relationship with the client through financial investments or employment. A substantial portion of each professional code of ethics focuses on controlling direct and indirect incentives, but controls also exist in audit firm and regulatory agency guidelines.
A second factor necessary for IR to exist is an opportunity for bias by the auditor to have a significant impact on the auditor's report. Opportunity may exist in the presence of complex financial transactions or when management must make significant estimates or assumptions. Opportunity for auditor bias also may exist when difficult interpretations of generally accepted accounting principles must be made and applied or in determining an appropriate level of reporting materiality. Opportunities for bias generally are controlled by generally accepted auditing standards, by audit firm policies, by regulatory agencies, and through effective corporate governance. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 (SEC 1999), for example, focuses on materiality and suggests that auditors may impair independence by allowing clients to influence materiality decisions.
Auditor integrity, and the opposite condition, lack of integrity, relates to the propensity of an individual auditor to engage in inappropriate activities. An auditor with high ethical standards may remain completely independent in thought and action despite the existence of strong incentives and available opportunities. Other auditors, however, may find incentives at some point to be too enticing to resist and, given opportunities, may allow financial statement to be published without issuing an appropriate opinion. Auditor integrity is controlled to the extent possible by audit firm culture (Ponemon 1992) , procedures and training, and by restrictions on entry into the profession.
To deal with the calculus through which we combine information to assess independence risk, there are several frameworks and formal languages that might be used. Included are those based on probability theory, fuzzy logic, possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 (Zadeh , 1979 or belief functions (Shafer 1976 , Smets 1990a , 1990b , 1998 . These frameworks have different tradeoffs and seem to be more applicable in certain problem domains than in other domains. Srivastava and Shafer (1992) argue that belief functions provide a more flexible and adaptable way to combine evidence (see also, Akresh et al. 1988) . One aspect of this flexibility is that the belief function framework reduces to the Bayesian framework in some situations. Belief functions also provide a coherent way of mapping uncertainty judgments in auditing (Harrison 1999 , Harrison et al. 2002 , and incorporating ambiguity within decision-making (Srivastava 1997, Srivastava and Mock 2000) .
In the evidential network approach under belief functions, items of evidence are combined using
Dempster's rule of combination. We have used the computer program "Auditor's Assistant" (Shafer et al.1988) to draw the evidential network and to perform our analyses using the belief-function framework. For example, the Auditor's Ethical and Moral Characteristics assessment in Figure 1 is related to the Integrity variable. The first number in the set of parentheses indicates the observer's belief that the auditor has integrity, in this case assumed to be 0.90 on a scale of zero to one. A zero value would indicate the assessor has no evidence while a value of one represents certainty. More specifically, a zero level of support in favor of Integrity means that there is no evidence that the auditor has integrity and a value of one means that the assessor is certain that the auditor has complete integrity. In Figure 1 , the second number in this set of parentheses, zero, indicates that in the judgment of the observer there is no evidence indicating a lack of integrity
The variable Maintain Independence is related with three other variables: 'Integrity', 'No Incentive', and 'No Opportunity' through an 'OR' relationship. This relationship is represented by the hexagonal box containing 'OR' in Figure 1 . The 'OR' implies that independence risk will be minimal in any one of the following conditions: the auditor has high integrity, or the auditor has no incentive to benefit, or there is no opportunity to benefit. Conversely, there will be a lack of independence only when there is a lack of integrity and there is incentive and opportunity.
----- Figure 1 here -----These three variables represented in Figure 1 by rectangular boxes with rounded corners are connected to rectangular boxes representing independence factors pertaining to the variables as described above.
For example, 'Firm Policy' represents a factor that pertains to the variables 'Integrity', 'No Incentive', and 'No Opportunity'. Audit firm policies encourage high integrity, help mitigate auditors' incentives, and limit opportunities to benefit inappropriately from the audit.
Similarly, 'Professional Policies', 'External Regulatory Agencies' and 'Corporate Governance' are three other factors that pertain to the same three variables. These factors also encourage auditor's integrity and mitigate auditors' incentive and opportunity to benefit from the audit. The factor 'Auditor
Characteristics' in the model only pertains directly to the variable 'Integrity'. The factor 'Direct and Indirect' indicate direct and indirect incentives as discussed above.
When assessing independence risk, it is important to obtain information on audit firm policies in these areas and to assess the effects of various other influences on IR. This model can assist in the assessment process as is demonstrated in the following analysis and results section. Figure 1 , of course, is only one way to specify how the factors that influence independence risk may be interrelated.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The sensitivity of the model to various influences on IR is assessed by developing a base-level model and then modifying the assumptions for that model to examine three research questions. The first question examines the impact of a lack of auditor integrity on IR. The second research question investigates the influence of professional standards, such as codes of ethics, on IR. The third research question investigates for an assumed level of belief regarding lack of integrity, the impact of opportunity and incentives on IR.
Base-Level Model
To analyze the model shown in Figure 1 , the observer first assigns values related to each factor in the rectangular boxes pertaining to each linked variable and then calculates the influence of such values on IR. In other words, given the information available, the observer needs to assess the level of support in favor of the variable or its negation. The assumed values for the various variables in the base-level model are detailed in Table 1 .
----- Table 1 here -----
While belief values are subjective, those in Table 1 are selected to represent realistic circumstances in actual audits. In our base-level model, assuming the assessor has supportive information on the Auditor's Ethical and Moral Characteristics, we assign belief values of 0.90 supporting (for) auditor integrity and zero belief value negating (against) auditor integrity. These levels indicate that the auditor being assessed appears to the observer to have high ethical and moral standards and that there is no evidence indicating otherwise. Such assumptions appear to be reasonable based on the numerous screening procedures employed by the profession and by individual auditing firms.
As noted previously, for Independence Risk to exist, there must be some form of opportunity allowing the auditor to make biased audit decisions. Part of the opportunity exists with the audit client itself, where a volatile business environment, transactions for which GAAP is not well defined, and the complexity of transactions each offer the opportunity for bias. Opportunity also is present when management must make difficult estimates and assumptions or when judgments required of the auditor relate to client or auditee characteristics, such as establishing reporting materiality levels. In Table 1 Corporate Governance provides the structure through which the objectives of a company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance (OECD 1999 
Research Question 1:
What is the impact of lack of integrity on auditor independence risk?
Hiring and certification processes, codes of ethics, and peer influences all serve to increase the likelihood that auditors exhibit high moral and ethical characteristics. Audit firms tend to hire top graduates, usually after consultation with faculty members and others regarding the graduates' academic abilities and character. The certification process serves as an additional filter by excluding individuals with criminal records and by requiring knowledge of the code of ethics. Even after certification, individuals can be expelled from the profession by being convicted of crimes or because of other transgressions.
To examine the influence of the moral and ethical propensities of the auditor on IR, as shown in Figure   2 , we examine the Auditor Ethical and Moral Characteristics for belief variable at three distinct levels:
zero, indicating no knowledge about integrity, 0.45 indicating a moderate level of integrity, and 0.90 indicating a high level of integrity. With the for belief value at zero, we increment the against belief value in steps of 0.10 from a value of zero to a value of 1.00. With the for belief value at 0.45, the against belief value is incremented in steps of 0.10 from zero to 0.50 and with the for belief value at 0.90, the against belief value is examined at zero and 0.1. Other for and against belief values in Table   1 , columns 5 and 6, are the same values as in the base-level model.
----- Figure 2 here -----As can be seen in Figure 2 , as the for belief value from Auditor's Ethical and Moral Characteristics increases from zero to 0.90, IR decreases from about 0.18 to 0.04. However, for a given level of a for belief value, as the against belief value, i.e. lack of integrity, increases, the IR increases, but at a much smaller rate. This finding indicates that unless the observer has a relatively high confidence in the auditor, IR likely will be at a very high and likely unacceptable level.
Research Question 2:
What is the impact of professional standards on auditor independence risk?
One mitigating factor depended on by users of financial statements is participation by various regulatory agencies in setting standards related to independence. Such agencies may be involved in the setting of standards related to audits, in the enforcement of those standards, or both (e.g. Pincus et al. 1987 ).
To examine the influence of regulatory agencies on IR, we vary the for belief values as follows (See Figure 3 and Table 1 , columns 7 and 8). Table 1 , columns 9 and 10). Second, the belief from Auditee Characteristics is varied as this belief value impacts only the No Opportunity variable.
----- Figure 4 here -----As can be seen in Figure 4 , as the belief for Incentives from Direct and Indirect Incentives is incremented in steps of 0.10 from zero to 1.00, IR essentially doubles from 0.11 to 0.20. This indicates that control of incentives is an important part of maintaining auditor independence. It also is seen that as the against belief for No Opportunities from Auditee Characteristics is incremented from zero to 1.00, IR increases from 0.13 to 0.19.
SUMMARY
The main purpose of this paper is to develop and then evaluate a formal model of auditor independence risk. This model has been developed as an initial step in understanding the importance of various factors identified in the literature which are thought to affect independence. The model is used to address three research questions involving assessing the impact of four factors on Independence Risk:
1. auditor integrity, 2. professional standards 3. direct and indirect incentives and 4. auditee characteristics.
Initial analyses show that independence risk is sensitive to each of these factors although the magnitude of the effects varies substantially across the cases examined. More specifically, the main results show that integrity is the key variable in minimizing independence risk. In addition, in cases where integrity could be questioned, independence risk is reduced when there are professional standards that are perceived to be effective and can be increased by certain client characteristics and auditor incentives.
Given that this paper is a first attempt at developing a formal model of independence risk, the model presented is quite simplified. In fact, the modeling results could be interpreted as merely establishing the * In the above independence risk model, a rectangular box with rounded corners represents a variable node and a rectangular box represents an independence factor node pertaining to the variable(s) to which it is linked. The first number in the variable node represents the level of belief ("belief value") that the variable is true and the second number represents the level of belief that the variable is not true. The independence factor nodes-Professional Policies, and External Regulatory Agencies-contain three sets of numbers each. In each case, these sets of numbers from left to right, respectively, pertain to the variables 'Integrity', 'No Incentive', and 'No Opportunity'. The first number in parentheses represents the belief that the corresponding variable is true and the second number represents the belief that the corresponding variable is not true. 
